VISITORS ARE URGED to access and READ THE IMPORTANT update and ADDENDA we were obliged to introduce in January 2002. We had no choice but to REPORT THE CRIMES TO THE TREASURY; our observations and knowledge of the constructive frauds made us accessories if we kept quiet, like the alleged victims who work towards the implementation of the schemes by the abductors and rapists of Justice, the Goddess; it was such a person who had been wasting out time and securing support through many a crocodile tear.  You will find the addenda statement at the top of the Updated Pages File. We are sure that you will share with us our concerns and most profound disappointment at and with persons who adopt and promote activities which they know are nothing but downright crimes. We refer to our exclusive page where we expose (as conscientious, law abiding citizens) the Confidentiality Between Fraudsters that exists care of the BEST OPEN SECRET. 

Guidelines on Navigating through the extensive material: access instructions.  

As part of the reconstruction process our new pages (and pages where changes and additions have been implemented, the improved / amended pages) are endorsed with the link 'Page Changes and the date of the last changes, at the top of the left column/margin, below the file name (*....xxxxx.htm *). The link takes visitors to a List of the changes implemented in the page. These include new material and links from relevant paragraphs to other or new relevant material in the page and or in other pages. For further clarification email: webmaster@

THE main sources of English law are legislation and unwritten law (1*). Legislation consists of laws made by or under the authority of Parliament and may be statutes (Acts of Parliament) or subordinate legislation that is to say, `statutory instruments', formerly known as Statutory Rules and Orders (which are Orders in Council, orders, rules and regulations made by a Minister of the Crown under the authority of a statute) or by-laws made by Local Government or other authorities exercising powers conferred upon them by Parliament. Unwritten law consists of common law and equity. There is, at present, no code of English law, although the Law Commission (see p. 36) is working on the codification of certain of its branches. The law today is contained in about 3,000 Acts of Parliament, some thousands of statutory instruments and statutory rules and orders, and over 300,000 reported cases.

The common law of England evolved from spontaneously observed rules and practices shaped and formalised by decisions made by judges pronouncing the law in relation to the particular facts before them. It was so called to distinguish it from local laws as well as from any law that was particular or special, such as the canon laws emanating from Rome or the law merchant practised in mercantile courts.

In the Anglo-Saxon period the principles applied in local courts broadly reflected the customs of local communities as declared by the freemen of those communities, who were the judges of the courts. After the Norman conquest in 1066 the King's judges gradually welded the many and varied local customs into a single body of general principles which they applied uniformly, first during their periodic circuits through the shires and later at their meetings in London to hear cases at the royal courts(2*). In order to achieve consistency, the judges placed great reliance on previous judgements given in similar cases, a practice which gave rise to the doctrine of judicial precedent(3*) upon which all law in England, other than legislation, is based. It is likely that the necessary information was at first passed from one judge to another through personal contact, but towards the end of the thirteenth century some unknown persons began to note down and circulate the rulings of judges both on circuit and in the royal courts and also the arguments of pleaders, as barristers (see p. 25) were then called. These notes were contained in Year Books, which covered the period 1283 to 1535 and were forerunners of the published Law reports that have existed in one form or another for more than 400 years

Actions in the common law courts were initiated by writs obtained from the Chancery (the office of the Chancellor and a skilled body of clerks(4*). Originally used by the Sovereign to settle disputes brought to his notice by subjects who had been, or considered themselves to have been wronged, the writ soon developed from a royal command ordering that an alleged wrong should be righted into a direction to an official to hold and inquiry into a complaint or to a defendant either to concede or to answer plaintiff's claim. During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries a great many writs were issued in a wide variety of forms, and presently they began to shape the main branches of common law and the procedure appropriate to those branches. As time went on a semi-official register of writs appeared, and this came to be regarded as an exhaustive catalogue of the causes of action known to law.

The circumscription of the law within the framework of the writ system (together with a temporary restriction on the office of the Chancellor to create new writs) acted as a brake on the development of the common law. After 1285 litigants were again able to obtain writs, but they ceased to be able to rely upon redress, since the courts of common law had established their right to declare that any cause or action that was not contrary to the established legal rules was unknown to law.

The special imperfections of the medieval common law are said(5*) to have been: as to the law itself, that it did not cover the whole field of obligations; and as to its administration, that it had no means of extracting the truth from litigants (since it relied on documents and refused to listen to the parties themselves), that its judgements were not capable of being adapted to special circumstances, that its process in the course of a suit was ineffective, and that even a successful suit might be an empty victory for the winner.

Some people who failed to get satisfaction in the common law courts were, however, allowed to petition the Sovereign or his council (see p. 4). These petitions were handled by the Chancellor who, as well as being `Keeper of the King's Conscience', was the head of the writ office and in this capacity presumed to be acquainted with the general working of the law. At first the Chancellor made recommendations to the council, but soon he began to take decisions on his own initiative and presently petitions(6*) came to be addressed direct to the Court of Chancery rather than to the King.

In certain matters the Court of Chancery was able to enforce rights not recognised at common law (as in trusts and married women's property). In other matters, such as contract, fraud, accounts and partnerships, it was able either to give an alternative and more efficient remedy or to provide a remedy to replace a common law remedy that had been lost. In matters outside its direct jurisdiction, it could use its special procedure (a) to help to determine the rights of parties in other courts by compelling the disclosure of facts and documents(7*), (b) to secure to the plaintiff, if successful, the fruits of litigation, and (c) to protect a third person from injury through the conflicting rights of others. The Court of Chancery exercised an overriding jurisdiction and could prevent proceedings in the common law courts from being made the instrument of oppression either by restraining their commencement or prosecution, or by forbidding the enforcement of a judgement made under them, as the case might require.

In these ways the Court of Chancery afforded an improved means of attaining justice, but this was the extent of the difference between equity and common law. No Chancellor ever attempted to dispute the right of common law judges to pronounce the law, and gradually-as the vigour of the early Chancellors gave way to the more conservative outlook of successors -the Court of Chancery adopted the common law court practice of relying on the process of legal analogy, holding wherever possible to the maxim that `equity follows the law'. The result was that, by the end of the eighteenth century, equity had hardened into a body of legal doctrine as settled as the common law, and the systems had grown so much alike-save that equity dealt with different claims and provided different remedies-that there was little to choose between them, particularly as regards simplicity or speed. By the nineteenth century equity rules had become so involved and technical that long delays were frequent and a dispute involving both common law and equity sometimes took years to resolve.

Reforms were made in 1873 and 1875 by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, which reorganised the courts and provided that, in their new form, all should use and apply both common law and equity. In order to overcome the difficulty that might arise where a judge was faced with two, possibly conflicting, sets of rules, the Act of 1873 laid it down that where rules of common law conflicted with those of equity the latter were to prevail.

The earliest examples of enacted laws in England were the ordinances of the Curia Regis (the King and his council), which, in the early Norman period, was the governing body of the realm. Law-making by Parliament did not begin until the thirteenth century; it was not until the sixteenth century that legislative Acts took the form in which they are cast today(8*) and until the late nineteenth century the amount of legislation was comparatively small. The position began to change after the passing of the Reform Act in I 832(9*) and since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been a very great increase both in the volume of legislation and in its scope. Nowadays there is scarcely any aspect of life that is not, in some measure, affected by it.

Since Parliament is the supreme law-making body in the United Kingdom, Acts of Parliament are absolutely binding on all courts, taking precedence over all other sources of law; they cannot be ultra vires (outside the competence of-in this case Parliament) for, although the principles of natural justice (broadly speaking, rules which an ordinary, reasonable person would consider fair) have always occupied an important position in the British constitution, they have never been defined or codified in the form of guaranteed rights. Thus rights, such as the right of personal freedom, the right of freedom of discussion, and the rights of association and public meeting, which are commonly considered more or less inviolate, are not protected against change by Act of Parliament, and the courts could not uphold them if Parliament decreed otherwise. Acts of Parliament are, in fact, formal announcements of rules of conduct to be observed in the future, which remain in force until they are repealed. The courts are not entitled to question or even discuss their validity-being required only to interpret them according to the wording used or, if Parliament has failed to make its intentions clear, according to certain canons of interpretation(10*).

This principle has no application to subordinate legislation (see p. 2), and it is open to any court before which such legislation may come to decide whether it is intra vires or ultra vires.

• The heading simply relates to & covers the realities POINTED to one John Charville, the guru who was sent along, by alleged leaders of victims of the rampant fraud & corruption through the courts. He came along to sell to Mr Andrew Yiannides, the founder of human-rights (and creator of this website) his extensive knowledge and coverage of waffle and precedent casel-aw, from the moon. [*Link to the FOOTNOTE of another page where we cover HOW & UNDER what circumstances Mr John Charville sprung into action and what followed thereafter].
• Nothing but irrelevant rubbish peddled by and for / on behalf of alleged leaders & or leading lights, of group-victims. Victims simply used for more of the same, as covered in one of the many scenarios we know of, such as the case stated in the left margin window where this LINK takes the reader / researcher, victim.
• Reference to the work: "By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves".  

• "It follows .... that national courts must protect rights conferred by provisions of the Community legal order and that it is not necessary for such courts to request or await the actual setting aside by national authorities empowered so to act of any national measures which might impede the direct and immediate application of Community rules (law implied).
• "It follows from the foregoing considerations that, according to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect".
• "The Court (Community) was asked to say whether Council Directive No. 64/221 of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a Member State"..........
• Accordingly, in reply to the question, Article 3(1) of Council Directive No 64/221 of 25 February 1964 confers on individuals rights which are enforceable by them in the courts of a Member State and which the national courts must protect".      

Click to enlarge images  & read of developments, legal argument, implied supremacy, the concept

& "Accordingly any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or JUDICIAL PRACTICE which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national law having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from having FULL FORCE and effect, are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community Law". [*Link to protection from FRAUD & CORRUPTION, & breaches by member State TREATED AS TORTS]

2*. The courts of Common Pleas, King's Bench, and Exchequer.

3*. Judicial precedent (that is to say, the application of the law to the ascertained facts) binds judges of the lower courts; it also normally binds judges in courts of equal rank, though the House of Lords (see p. 11) declared in 1966 that it would in future be prepared to depart from its own previous decisions where it seemed just to do so.

4*. `The chief clerks were called Masters. The foremost among them was known as the Master of the Rolls and frequently deputised for the Chancellor in his judicial work.

5*. `Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. X.

6*. `During the fifteenth century these petitions became more frequent, and although initially such relief was spasmodic and dependent on the facts of the case, by the sixteenth century there were, in addition, certain areas of the law where it was usual for the Chancellor to provide relief. However, in contrast to the common law, remedies in equity were discretionary; this is still true today.

7*. `The reliance of the common law courts on written documents for the greater part of their evidence rendered them powerless if a necessary document was in the hands of the opposing party, or contained a mistake, or was lost.

8*. 'Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-'

9*. The first of several Acts of Parliament which reformed the electoral system and extended the franchise.

10*. If, by either of these means, the courts reach a decision contrary to the intentions of Parliament, Parliament must either accept the decision or pass an amending Act. Meanwhile, the decision stands. (Note: We draw our visitors' attention to a very simple case. It covered fraudulent costs imposed on clients by the legal circles. The House of lords ruled on the practices in 1938-39  [*Link to case stated). YET successive governments DID NOTHING for over 40 years, WHILE the judicial chair occupants in the lower courts as blind, deaf and dumb as ever. Law & Order? DEMOCRATIC governance?]