- Everything was pleaded in the stated facts but
one element was deliberately not pointed to in the violations, as pleaded for
professionals whose prime duty is to apply FACTS & EVENTS STATED - known, to
applicable law.
- Mr Andrew Yiannides, the founder of the facility
for citizens : human-rights.org had his own plans for the abusers of Public office.
- The facilities on the Internet and the Community
on Line were never intended for serfs or for 'the sold to the system as is' fraudsters and
dreaming charlatans.
- Link please to the explicit letter/FAX to the court (in the main window / frame of the page you are linked to from here) (ECoHR) and note the court's immediate response (in the
margin / left window).
- In due course we will disclose what was / has
been in line for ALL abusers of public office and all SOLD TO THE SYSTEM charlatans, dreaming fraudsters and conniving shysters who contacted Mr Yiannides of their own
steam or as contacted thereafter and directed, as controlled and or as blackmailed
stooges.
- USE OF THE LAW as is, was and remains the
spring board FOR HUMAN-RIGHTS. (Never overlook the fact that the law
is no ass).
- The media barons and the Intellectual Prostitutes
they retain and control had and have their plans for the sons of men.
- Mr Yiannides (one of the sons of men targeted)
has had his own plans for 'humans' and not the type of zombies and morons who were sent
along through whom to prove NOT WHO, but WHAT ELEMENTS ARE USED BY THE CRIMINALS WHO HAVE
BEEN IN CONTROL FOR FAR TOO LONG in allegedly democratic states that allegedly are founded
and resting on principles of law and order.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
14.
1. I came to the UK in November
1977. I had no knowledge of the English language or the Law. I was born in Peru, and grew
up under a completely different legal and social system.
2. I met Mr Marcus Parker-Rhodes, a
British Citizen, and we were married on 5th July 1980, while I was studying English in the
UK and working as an Au pair.
3. One child was born of the
marriage on 1st October 1982.
4. By 1987 I was made aware that my
husband was involved in an extramarital relationship and in June 1988 my husband and I
agreed that there was no possibility of change in the situation and that we should proceed
to a divorce. Both of us retained solicitors to that effect
5. The solicitors referred our case
to the Family Law Bar Association for settlement of and property adjustment and for
financial arrangements in respect of our child. We were invited to sign a consent document
to the effect that we would abide by the decision of the FLBA. However, as stated below,
and not until I collected the file of documents from my solicitors, in June 1998, the said
document was nullified by the fact that both my husband and I did not accept the FLBA
decision. The aforesaid nullification of the document was confirmed in letters the
solicitors exchanged but was never referred to me, by my solicitors.
6. Marcus had been living with his
girlfriend from 1989 to 1992 (well over 2 years) and he is still living with her now. She
was single and there were no other children in the new relationship. My husband
volunteered and was paying towards our child's needs and towards the cost of maintaining
the house and myself, while I was at home raising our child, and trying to do some
part-time work as a shiatsu practitioner.
7. Marcus was a well-known and
established animator who had won several prizes. He participated in the production of
Monty-Python with Terry Gilliam and worked, also, with Bob Godfrey, twice winner of an
Oscar for animation. Marcus had declared earnings in the sum of £ 24,900 in 1993 at the
time of 'the divorce settlement agreement', allegedly by consent, as referred to, and
stated herein below.
8. At the time of the divorce I was
earning £ 2500 a year from occasional work while I was a full time mother and
home-keeper.
9. Marcus had a private pension
fund. He was paying £160 per month towards it.
10. The matrimonial home was an end
of terrace Victorian 4 bedroom property with a garden backing onto Highgate Woods; there
was no mortgage or a mortgage charge on the property. The property was subdivided in two,
the ground floor was a 2 bedroom self-contained flat in a good state, and the first floor
arranged as a studio.
11. My ex-husband's brother was the
owner of a separate self-contained 4 bedroom flat in the same building. There were
separate leases for the two households.
12. I carried out also extensive
renovations to the property (our matrimonial home) over several years and Marcus did not
get involved in the work, as he declared on affidavit in the course of the divorce
negotiations / proceedings.
13. In the course of the divorce
proceedings and settlement negotiations, Marcus declared, also on affidavit, that he had
inherited more than £100,000 from his family.
14. We had agreed on the valuation
of the furniture at £ 12,000 on a probate basis.
15. Throughout I did have, I was to
have, the responsibility of looking after the child of the marriage, as had been agreed
that I was more suitable for that effect, and there were no restrictions on access rights,
by the father, except the ones imposed by his girlfriend/partner. Marcus's girlfriend
Gwenda Foord had no children.
16. The settlement agreed, by the
legal teams, was that I should receive a lump sum of £45,000 and support with an
additional £ 30,000 towards a mortgage for acquisition, of a property for the child and I
to move to. It had also been agreed by the legal teams, that £45 per week, for the
child's maintenance should be paid by the father. The terms implied that the child and I
should leave the matrimonial home where the child was born and had grown up in with her
two cousins with whom we shared the garden and all common facilities at the house. This
seemed too harsh for the children, at the time, and my ex-husband's brother and his family
concurred with that view.
17. I considered the proposals as
unacceptable and improper on the grounds that the child and I would be separated from the
immediate family circle and that any move by the child and I would, was to, entail
additional costs and disruption problems in respect of the child's education and
environment.
18. I also considered the financial
arrangements, as proposed, to have been inadequate. As part of the ongoing attempts to
reach a satisfactory and fair settlement we secured a valuation of the matrimonial home,
the leasehold registered in Marcus' name, from estate agents. We had agreed the valuation.
As a consequence there had been an offer, from a cash buyer, who was ready to buy the
leasehold at £115,000.
19. My solicitors persisted that
the arrangements they negotiated were the best they could secure under the circumstances.
As a result I had no option but to seek second opinions from other solicitors. A number
indicated that they were in agreement with my concerns that:
19.1. the proposed financial
settlement was inadequate
19.2. any move from the property, the child and I
were already in possession of and living in, would be:
19.2.1 unsettling for the child
19.2.2 and entail additional costly outgoings
in terms of commissions and legal fees.
20. I had spoken at length to a
number of solicitors. One of the solicitors, who invited me along after indicating that
she shared my concerns, was the solicitor that I subsequently instructed. In the course of
the meeting(s) that led to the change over and the transfer of my papers/case I was asked
to sign papers. I was not surprised at the suggestion that my new solicitors' team should
first renegotiate what the FLBA had put forward as a settlement agreement.
21. My new solicitor knew, as of
the first instance when I contacted them and thereafter, that I had not agreed with the
terms of the negotiated settlement that had been promoted and presented to me by the
previous firm who were representing me. I refused to succumb to their pressures for
several months. Ms. Coubrough, the solicitor handling my case, told me in the course of
our meeting on 22 September 1993 that, by law, I had to follow the FLBA opinion, as Mr.
Van Endem, my ex-husband's solicitor, also stipulated.
22. The settlement provided also
that in the event that I entered into any relationship, my husband would withdraw funding
in the event of my child leaving the new home or if I went to live with another man or in
the event of my child reaching the age of 18.
23. I was told, in no uncertain
terms by my Solicitors, that they would abandon me and that she would block the Legal Aid
facility, if I did not accept what they presented to me as an acceptable financial
arrangement.
24. Furthermore my solicitors were
threatening me, orally and in letters too, with 'justifiable rights in law' that my
husband had, as they asserted, which he could use in order to evict me from the
matrimonial home. In the circumstances I began to search for alternative accommodation. I
found a dilapidated flat that was all I could afford, under the agreement being imposed on
me and I informed my solicitors accordingly. By seeking and aiming to impose such
settlement conditions on me, my Solicitor (Ms Coubrough) put me in a state of severe undue
hardship. It was an utterly unnecessary thing to do, which I now recognise as calculated
and intentional, leading to my having to capitulate to 'wrongs as imposed on me, that no
one would be prepared to address within the United Kingdom'.
25. The agreement that I was caused
to sign, under the conditions and circumstances stated above, was presented to the court
for endorsement and issue by the court. I was neither present nor was I made aware of how
and when the court was invited to endorse what my solicitors and their counterparts
created, as 'the best settlement under the circumstances'.
26. I moved with our child to the
new property, which I bought for £ 65,000 with the £45,000 and the 'additional'
loan/charge facility of £20,000 that Marcus secured on the property, subject to the terms
and conditions that were imposed on me by my Solicitors. Marcus secured the funds through
a mortgage facility and charge on the matrimonial property.
27. Thereafter, whenever I talked
to barristers and solicitors, I was always told, 'that although I appeared to be right in
my argument that it could not be logical I was offered less than half of the worth of the
matrimonial assets', nonetheless I was stuck with a Consent Order. On each and every
occasion I was told there was nothing that could be done.
28. To meet our living costs and
essential outgoings I secured part-time work. I also applied for assistance from the state
because, in my circumstances I qualified. As a result the Child Support Agency, that was
set up by the government to look into and assist in circumstances, contacted me. The Child
Support Agency were given full particulars and all necessary information regarding my
situation and what I knew regarding the child's father. They advised that as the father
was already paying £45 per week, towards the child's needs, and as that was not part of
'the court settlement' my child and I had to survive on whatever my income and assistance
came to.
29. In 1996 my contract of
part-time work came to an end I contacted the authorities about the change of my
circumstances. Other state officials accordingly notified the Child Support Agency and
their officers contacted me. All they did for us was to cause and bring about changes,
such as my husband stopping his £45 weekly payments.
30. Throughout 1996 to 1998 the
child and I had to survive under very difficult circumstances, on state benefit. The Child
Support Agency never considered the father should be made liable for any regular payments
for our child. He was in receipt of rental income from the property that the child and I
were caused to move out of, and he was also benefiting from a substantial income through
his work. During that period I would speak, of our circumstances, to friends and
acquaintances and to any contacts they would recommend. Eventually I decided to act on the
suggestion of a friend.
31. I wrote to the solicitors and I
asked for the file of papers pertaining to the divorce case they handled and settled for
me. They arranged for me to collect it.
32. As I went through the papers
contained in the file I kept coming across documents covering issues that were never
referred to me, by my solicitors. I spoke of the issues to the friend who advised me to
ask for the file and I explained the situation attached to papers and documents pertaining
to the divorce matters the solicitors handled and dealt with that the solicitor never
referred to me. His suggestion was that I should seek legal advice, in the circumstances.
33. A can of worms had opened up
and none of the solicitors I contacted, in order to discuss the issues, was willing to act
for me or to represent me and take my case to court.
34. I contacted solicitors to whom
I gave full particulars as my friend had explained. Solicitors applied for Legal Aid
assistance because of my circumstances and apart from a 'limited to barrister's opinion
certificate' I was denied proper representation on the issues the documented evidence
covered.
35. One of the solicitors, whose
services I managed to retain, Mr. Patel, delayed an essential meeting with a barrister for
more than a year. When eventually that meeting took place I was told by the barrister, in
1998, that it was too late to take any action, to remedy the situation, because of
provisions under Limitation Acts. Through such defaults and omissions I was being used, a
pawn at the mercy of the legal experts. This led me to start visiting in earnest libraries
in order to look up serious issues. I needed to know about 'statute barred' and anything
that I could come across that could cover the activities and the documented events such as
my solicitor engaged in, without reference to me, while in control of my affairs.
36. I was being denied proper
representation on the issues the documented evidence covered and I needed answers and
legal justifications to the problems I was lumbered and faced with.
37. In conversation with Mr Patel,
I was told (in what was a slip as opposed to a direct statement) that it appeared to have
been a case of misconduct by the solicitors. I sought explanations but the solicitor
changed the subject. At that point I recognised that his slip could explain why no one was
prepared to act for me. In the circumstances I spoke to friends who suggested that I
should do some serious research on the issues in my local library or one that had a good
legal section.
38. Because I had been told that
the issues could amount to 'misconduct' by the solicitors, I needed to be better informed
in order to contact the governing body of solicitors, the Law Society. In the
circumstances I begun in earnest to visit regularly libraries in order to research the
issues and I followed up every discovery, from precedent case law to case law such as were
covered in chapters attached to relevant sections of the Limitations Acts.
39. When I contacted the Law
Society, I was put in touch with the Office for Supervision of Solicitors. Later I
discovered that the Law Society, itself, maintains the O.S.S. I had been naive and I
recognised that issue. In the matter of reliance on legal representation for and in my
interest, by solicitors and barristers, I was fast becoming aware of the simple realities.
I soon recognised that I was even more naïve to expect and or to rely on a body
maintained by the Law Society (the union protecting the interests of its members) to
maintain the OSS in the interest of the public.
40. I soon discovered that the Law
Society and the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors would not be considering,
favourably, my rights in law. Protecting their members through contempt of the evidence
would also lead to nothing but court action against their members, and that would create
work for their members and their circles.
41. I was left with no option but
to give notice to the Solicitors Indemnity Fund and with my little knowledge and
understanding of the legal technicalities I decided to act. I issued a writ against the
solicitor who took advantage of my luck of knowledge and understanding of the matters they
clearly misrepresented to me, and more than likely as I saw matters at the time, also to
the court.
42. Following service of the writ
the solicitor entered an appearance and filed a defence pleading that the case should be
struck out because the Claim was statute barred. An application to that effect was issued
and served with supporting Statement of Facts. The documents were served on me and I
responded by submitting my own Statement of Facts challenging the solicitor's deposition.
In the course of a preliminary hearing, which the solicitor failed to attend, the Master
heard my arguments that were based on Law and the evidence that I had uncovered while
going through the file. Simply put, the solicitor had concealed and failed to disclose to
me a number of very relevant issues and even actions the solicitor took without disclosing
such matters to me. Those elements qualified and clarified the fact that the position
could not possibly ever be presented as the solicitor addressed and submitted to the
court. The Master issued directions and stipulated that the solicitor should attend court
in person in order for the court to deal with the matters before it.
43. As my understanding and
knowledge of law gradually increased and I begun to understand more and more of the
complexities on the conduct of my affairs by the Solicitors I also begun to recognise that
I should amend my pleadings and Statement of Claim. I went to the Royal Courts of Justice
and I attended the Practice Master for assistance and directions. I did as I was advised
and I served notice of my intentions on the Solicitors representing the Solicitors. They
wrote back to state they objected, so, I prepared and delivered an Application, as I had
been told by the Practice Master and I proceeded to the Royal Courts of Justice, the
Masters' office, for the issue of the Application by the staff.
44. The bundle of papers that I
subsequently prepared for the court was re-organised by the Solicitors representing the
Defendant Solicitor. The documents in the bundle that I collected, from the court
subsequent to the hearing before HH Justice Rimer, evince my actions and my need for the
court to address all issues, in accordance with the evidence at hand. However the Amended
Statement was not included as submitted by me, indicating the fact that the bundle of
documents had been tampered with.
45. Although the Master directed
that the Solicitor who had been in charge of my affairs, should attend court for the
adjourned hearing of the Solicitors application and my challenges as to the facts and
merits of my case, the Solicitor again failed to attend. The Master pointed to the fact
that if arrangements were made quickly, he would be able to sit on the case before the
summer vacation. It was essential he stated that the court dealt with the issues and to
determine if there was a case to be answered, as my submissions and the precedent cases I
referred to that were covered in law books I researched, on the issue of statutory
limitations.
46. I attended court with a friend
in order to secure a new date for the adjourned hearing as requested and directed by the
Master. My application was for the matter to be set down before the Master (who had
familiarised himself with the case) as he indicated. Somehow the Defendant's Solicitors
were informed by the court staff, and between them they organised and secured an emergency
hearing, during the vacation period, to be heard by a Judge on the grounds that the
Defendant Solicitor was leaving the country.
47. I attended court for the
purposes of the preliminary hearing with my daughter and the friend who acted as my
litigation friend for the occasion. He had assisted me, also, to put the papers in the
solicitor's file, in chronological order, and to prepare a list of the documents. Mr
Yiannides, from the human-rights non-governmental organisation, whom I contacted on the
Internet, attended the hearing also. He was passing notes, to me, covering observations on
the proceedings and guidance on the developments at court.
48. Barrister appearing for the
Defending Solicitors was anticipating of the Judge/court to deal with the issues, by way
of arguments as submitted to court in writing, and without oral examination of the
statements submitted. After extensive representations on both parties, HH Justice Rimer
adjourned for lunch and announced that for the purposes of the hearing, oral examination
was important. He further clarified that he had decided that I did have the right to
cross-examine the solicitor who was in control of my affairs.
49. Extensive reference to the
bundle of documents, filed at court and served to the Defendant Solicitors, was made
throughout the hearings. The solicitor did not denounce or challenge the authenticity of
the documents in the bundle including the letters sent to me and the notes that were in
the file handed to me in June 1998.
50. When the court reconvened for
the oral examination of the Solicitor I handed to the defending Barrister and to the court
a true photocopy of one of the precedent cases that I came across while researching points
of law. It covered the issue of limitations, and in particular 'as of when time begins to
run'. The case made it very clear that in so far as higher authorities were concerned
"time begun to run as of when 'an authority on the subject confirmed the wrong
suffered by or done to the plaintiff".
51. At the conclusion of the
hearing HH Justice Rimer announced that he was to refer to the precedent cases both
parties relied upon and to the notes he made, also to the bundle of documents lodged at
court before delivering Judgement. I was given to understand that it was implied that
judgement would be delivered later in writing. The person from human-rights clarified that
judgement had to be delivered in open court. HH Justice Rimer, in fact, proceeded to
stipulate that the parties would have to appear before him early in the morning on the
Friday, the last day he was sitting at the Royal Court of Justice for the vacation period.
52. I attended Court, early Friday
morning, with my litigation friend. I was shocked to hear that his HH was dismissing my
claim and endorsing the solicitor's application. The judgement I looked upon as in
contempt of the facts and the evidence in the bundle of documents perused during the
hearing and cross-examination. His honour also elected to ignore the intimidation, the
coercion and even the threats bordering on black mail that had been established in so far
as witnesses attending the hearing could recognise and ascertain. The submitted documented
evidence established and support my claims.
53. I telephoned Mr Yiannides of
the human-rights non-governmental organisation, who attended 3 of the hearings, including
the preliminary hearing. Like me, he was shocked. He recommended that I should apply
immediately for a transcript of the judgement deliberations and to serve notice of appeal.
He emphasised that the transcript was crucial and that I should make it clear that it was
essential for the purpose of the appeal and to instruct solicitors who would be retained
for that purpose.
54. As an assisted person I
qualified for the issue of the transcript at public expense. I was faced with obstructions
and delays before the transcript was made available to me. When the transcript was ready
for me to collect, from the transcribers, Mr Yiannides attended me and I was able with his
assistance to lodge the essential appeal, as settled by human- rights, within time. More
obstructions and delays followed and extensive communications were necessary in order to
challenge attempts to dismiss my appeal on technicalities 'created with intent by others'.
55. Because of a very clear
conflict in the judgement deliberations it was crucial that I should secure a transcript
of the hearing for the purposes of my appeal. This was essential even though HH Justice
Rimer determined that the agreement presented to the Judge, for approval by court, as
settled by the legal teams, was imposed on me without input from the court. Nonetheless,
in the actual judgement delivered by HH the words used were "no undue influence"
which to me, and to those present at the hearing, indicated "just reasons to justify
the judgement entered", albeit without reference to any of the facts supported by the
extensive documented evidence.
56. Leave to Appeal the judgement
was refused and HH Justice Rimer gave as reasons the opinion that "an appeal was not
likely to succeed". In the light of the aforesaid reasons it became most important
that I should secure a transcript of the whole hearing before HH Justice Rimer.
57. I was being denied the right to
the full transcript of the hearing before HH Justice Rimer, this time by the court staff.
HH Justice Rimer elected to block my right to appeal through his refusal and reasons for
refusal. Up to the moment of dismissal of my Claim and the subsequent obstructions by the
court I had been under the impression that the right to appeal was an automatic right for
persons who not only believed but also had evidence to prove they had been wronged. I
therefore considered the obstructions to my need to refer my grievances to a higher court
as deliberate obstructions in order to deny me access "to unhindered access to court
and to unadulterated Justice". The denial and obstructions to a full transcript of
the hearing, and the obstructions by many in the matter of securing a hearing date for the
purposes of my needs and "Leave to Appeal" I regarded also as intentional and
deliberate. In the circumstances I was advised to apply to the Court of Appeal for an
Order in order to secure the transcript that would support my appeal and establish also
that the documented evidence had been referred to, on the relevant day. The issue covered
in the deliberations of HH Justice Rimer relative to "imposed" agreement was
well founded and his HH Justice Rimer did not fail to recognise it.
58. Extensive communications
exchanged with the Civil Appeal Office resulted with an invitation to the court. The
letter informing me of the time and place was clearly endorsed with the fact that I was to
attend court for the purpose of my application for a transcript of the whole of the
hearing before HH Justice Rimer.
59. I prepared an affidavit and
exhibits, which I delivered to the court, as my statement of facts and argument, on the
day. I attended court with Mr Yiannides who had been assisting me ever since the
preliminary hearing. On arrival, we found out that the case had been transferred to
another court and was to be heard by another Judge than the judge it had been assigned to,
as listed and published for the day. We were expecting my daughter to attend the hearing
and a litigation friend. Mr Yiannides went to request of the information service, at the
entrance to the court, to inform visitors, who seek assistance of and about the change of
venue and to direct anyone enquiring about my case to the new venue.
60. Another case was in progress
when we entered the court and we waited for my case to be called. When Mr Yiannides, my
Litigation Friend, and I proceeded to our places at the applicant's area, the court usher
came over to us and we informed the court that I was being assisted by a Litigation
Friend, for the purposes of my application. I repeated my statement and I requested of LJ
Aldous to acknowledge my statement and rights to assistance. I was flatly told that HL had
read my affidavit and perused the exhibits attached. He then informed me that I was to
deal with my case alone, and that my Litigation Friend was not to take part in the
proceedings. At that juncture the court usher, who was standing by, physically removed my
Litigation Friend from the bench where he had been standing, next to me. The usher told Mr
Yiannides that her instructions from His Lordships were clear "you either sit in the
back, as a visitor, or you are ejected from the court altogether". As I did not know
of any way to address or challenge the developments and as my Litigation Friend was not
given any leave to address the court, my Litigation Friend proceeded to seat at the back,
I was then left alone to deal with my application.
61. His Lordship having informed me
that he had read the affidavit and the attached exhibits, had given the impression that
the court was to deal with my application for the transcript. The letter inviting me to
the hearing clearly covered that issue only. It was not to be the case, however. His
Lordship simply ignored my application and the letter inviting me to the court for the day
and proceeded simply to dismiss the Leave to Appeal and pronounced an order to that
effect. I gave notice of my intention to Appeal to a full panel of the court. I needed for
a full panel of the court of Appeal to hear my Appeal and to endorse, if their Lordships
so determine the activities and wrongdoing that I had been subjected to. I asked of the
associate to ensure that the court's order should be forward as soon as possible, without
delays as it would be needed for my purposes.
62. There followed extensive
communications for and in respect of my right to an appeal proper before full panel of the
Court of Appeal and the need for issue of the transcript, of the preliminary hearing,
prior to the hearing of my Appeal. The evidence establishing the conclusive and clear
"imposed" settlement agreement that I was caused to sign as stated herein and in
the course of all court appearances. Whereas the Court of Appeal, staff, were hastening to
post and cause to be delivered an order that was not in conformity with the purposes of
the invitation to the court on 20th December 2001, they were denying me my rights to
unhindered access to Justice.
63. Further exchanges with the
Civil Appeals Office and a request for the right to petition the Judicial Section of the
House of Lords resulted with an Order dated 16th January 2002 stipulating and qualifying
that the application to Petition the House of Lords was dismissed.
page - 4 - of the application
III. STATEMENT OF ALLEGED VIOLATION(S) OF THE
CONVENTION AND/OR PROTOCOLS AND OF RELEVANT ARGUMENTS.
15.
Article 6.
(a) Lack of impartiality at and in the conduct of the
courts' business.
(b) No fair hearing and contempt of and for the documented evidence
lodged at court and perused at the hearing before HH Justice Rimer.
(c) Contempt for the right to assistance
by a person of the Petitioner's choice for the purposes of a Court hearing, and in
particular when attending the invitation for one specific application only to be
railroaded and hijacked for other aims.
Article 2.
Cont | 
